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MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION:

A PROBLEM

NOT SOLVED BY THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY
TAX ACT OF 1981
NANCY E. SHURTZ*

Many who have wandered through the maze of the federal income tax
laws are aware of the inequities known as the "marriage penalty" and the
"singles penalty." 1 The "singles penalty" arose in 1948 when married
couples were allowed to consolidate their incomes and use a different rate
schedule which was more favorable than that used by a single taxpayer.
Under the joint-rate schedule, which is still in effect, income belonging to or
earned by one spouse can be attributed to the other spouse. Therefore, when
only one spouse has income, the couple will pay less tax than a single taxpayer with the same amount of income. When both spouses have income,
the progressive nature of the tax code creates a substantial tax burden or
"marriage penalty," since the lower-paid spouse's income is taxed at the
marginal rate of the higher-paid spouse. Even the "married filing separate"
schedule, established in 1969, results in less favorable rates than the single
schedule. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 19812 partially eliminates the
"marriage penalty" but leaves the "singles penalty" intact.
This article will examine the recent changes made by the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 regarding the marriage and singles penalties. Section I of the article discusses the history of marital status taxation leading up
to the Economic Recovery Tax Act. Section II describes the current law and
its effect upon marital status discrimination. Section III analyzes possible
alternatives to the recent legislation that may reduce what can still be
viewed as a discriminatory tax policy.
* Visiting Associate Professor, University of Oregon Law School; on leave from The
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Ohio State University College of Law;
LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center.
1. See generally Alvarez, Dicriminationon the Basis ofSex and Marital Status in Tax and Related
Laws, 46 CONN. BAR J. 496 (1972); Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 1389 (1975); Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working
Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 49 (1971); Bruton, The Taxation of Family Income, 41
YALE L.J. 1172 (1932); Cooper, Working Wives andthe Tax Law, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 67 (1970);
Gerzog, The Marriage Penalty: The Working Couple's Dilemma, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 27 (1978);
Harmelink & Krause, Reduction of Tax DicriminatonBased on Filing Status: A Proposal,55 TAXES
760 (1977); Mess, For Richer, For Poorer Federal Taxation and Marriage, 28 CATH. U.L. REv. 87
(1978); Oldman & Temple, Comparative Analysis of the Taxation ofaMarriedPersons, 12 STAN. L.
REV. 585 (1960); Sjostrand, Income Tax System Needs a New Motor, Not Just an Overhaul, 54 TAXES
419 (1976); Watson, The Problem of Income Tax in Community Property States, 27 NEB. L. REV. 541
(1948); Note, Community Property and the FederalIncome Tax, 14 CALIF. L. REV. 351 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Community Property]; Note, Epilogue to the Community Property Scramble: Problems of
Repeal, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1950); Note, Disparity in Federal Income Tax Rates: Dicnmnination
Against the Single Taxpayer, 4 IND. LEGAL F. 380 (1970).
2. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 173 (1981) (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
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OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

The tax legislation in the United States, as it has affected marital status,
has been erratic and often contradictory. From the beginning, the government has had no consistent policy. In the first individual income tax law in
3
the United States, the Revenue Act of 1913, Congress did not consider mar4
ital status as a basis of taxation. The tax unit was the individual and each
individual was taxed according to one rate schedule. Husbands and wives
had to file separate returns if each had income. The married taxpayer was
taxed at the same rate as the single taxpayer, but was allowed an additional
exemption for his or her spouse. Even though the tax appeared to be neutral, married persons had an advantage over single persons. In common law
states, married persons could, by agreement, lower their marginal tax rate by
shifting income to their spouses. This could be accomplished either through
5
trusts, partnerships, employment, or corporate arrangements. In the eight
6
community property states, in which half of the earnings of each spouse
belonged to the other and property acquired during the marriage was owned
in equal shares, income was automatically shifted to a taxpayer's spouse even
7
though the management and control was usually in the husband. Thus,
because of this automatic shifting in income, couples in community property
states usually paid less income tax than identical couples in common law
states. This shift, whether automatic or by agreement, resulted in married
couples paying less tax than single individuals, except in the rare instance
where both husband and wife each earned equal amounts of income.
The Revenue Act of 19188 established a joint return for married
couples; however, there was no advantage in using the joint return because
the same progressive tax rates applied to both single and joint returns. In
fact, the joint return increased a married couple's tax liability if both earned
income during the tax year. 9 Under the 1918 Act, as under the 1913 Act,
married couples had an advantage over single persons, in that they could
minimize their total tax burden by shifting income to their spouse and filing
separately. Again, couples in community property states did not have to
3.

Ch. 16, § II(A)(1)(2), 38 Stat. 166.

4. Mess, supra note 1,at 100, suggests numerous plausible reasons the individual taxpayer
was chosen as the proper tax unit: 1)the large number of single individuals, 2) the trend
toward recognition of separate property rights for women, and 3) a tacit assumption that the
term "individual taxpayer" referred only to the male gender.
5. Such shifting arrangements were probably not used frequently, however, because
1) people lacked knowledge of such schemes, 2) such schemes required the aid of a lawyer, and
3) the tax rates were low enough that such schemes were unnecessary.
6. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington.
7. Each state's laws-are different, however. Personal service income is generally considered community income. Income from separate property is considered community in some
states and not in other states. This aggregation of community income also occurs in other countries, see, e.g., Spain, Argentina, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic. Oldman & Temple, supra
note 1, at 585; see also HARVARD LAW SCHOOL INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM IN TAXATION,
WORLD TAX SERIES [hereinafter cited as WORLD TAX SERIES].

8. Ch. 18, § 223, 40 Stat. 1074.
9. In unusual circumstances, joint filing could be advantageous. For example, a joint
return could increase a generous couple's deductions for charitable contributions by increasing
their adjusted gross income and hence raise the deduction ceiling which is determined by a
percentage of adjusted gross income. SeeBittker, supra note 1,at 1400 n.20.
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engage in income-shifting devices, since state law automatically split their
income.
Until 1920, the Department of the Treasury had no published policy on
the splitting of income by married residents of community property states. '0
It was generally known, however, that the Treasury required all community
income to be reported by the husband.II In September 1920, Attorney General Palmer issued to the Secretary of the Treasury an opinion which concluded that the community property laws of one state-Texas-were fully
effective for federal income tax purposes. 12 Palmer, who advocated that
state laws should be recognized in these matters, reasoned that because the
husband and wife were legally joint owners of the property under Texas law,
they could divide the income from community property and each report half
of it to the federal government. In 1921, the Attorney General issued another opinion that reached the same conclusion with respect to all community property states except California.1 3 In California, the husband had the
complete control of the community interest and could dispose of it as he saw
fit during his lifetime without the consent of his wife. The rights and powers
of the wife in California were in other respects the same as in the other community property states. The California courts, however, had described the
wife's interest as an "expectancy" rather than a "vested" interest.' 4 Because
of this characterization by the state court, the Attorney General concluded
the husband in California should be taxed on all the community property.
Attorney General Palmer's opinions were adopted in 1920 and 1921
Treasury Decisions.' 5 The 1921 decision addressed for the first time the issue of federal estate taxes on married couples. ' 6 The decision adopted a rule
similar to the income tax rule that only half of the community property in
community property states (other than California) was to be included in the
7
estate of the decedent husband.'
It was not long before these rulings were challenged by taxpayers from
California. The estate tax ruling was initially challenged in Blum v. Wardrli.'8 The federal district court held that in California half of the community property taken by the wife upon the death of the husband is not part of
the husband's estate and, therefore, not subject to federal estate tax. On
March 26, 1924, the Treasury acquiesced in this opinion. 19 Interestingly,
this acquiescence applied to income taxes as well as estate taxes, and stated
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
(1920).
16.
in 1916.
17.
18.
(1922).
19.

See Community Propery, rupra note 1, at 354 n.10.
Id. at 354.
32 Op. Att'y Gen..298 (1920).
32 Op. Att'y Gen. 435 (1921).
In re Moffitt's Estate, 153 Cal. 359, 95 P. 655 (1908).
T.D. 3138, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 238 (1921); T.D. 3071, 22 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 456
J.

PECHMAN, FEDERAL

TAX PoLIcY 296 (3d ed. 1977). The estate tax was established

T.D. 3138, 23 .Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 238 (1921).
270 F. 309 (N.D. Cal. 1920), aJ'd, 276 F. 226 (9th Cir. 1921), crt. denied, 258 U.S. 617
T.D. 3569, 26 Treas. Dec. int. Rev. 60 (1924).
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that residents of California should be allowed to split their community property income like residents of other community property states.
While the Blum case was being litigated, Congress attempted in the
Revenue Act of 192120 to deal with the issues raised by the case. This Act
was to have included a uniform rule that would not discriminate between
couples in community property and common law states. The rule would
have provided: 1) that income received by any married couple in a community property state was includable in the gross income of the spouse who
managed and controlled the community property, and 2) that half of the
community property taken by the wife on the death of her husband was
taxable as part of the estate of the decedent. Even though this provision
passed the House and was reported by the Senate Finance Committee, it was
dropped in conference and deleted on the Senate floor. 2 ' Thus, the problem
of marital discrimination was left unresolved.
In 1924 the Secretary of the Treasury recommended a similar provision
to the House Ways and Means Committee; however, the provision was never
adopted. In fact, under the Revenue Act of 1924,22 Treasury Regulations
were implemented, which followed the earlier opinions of Attorney General
Palmer and the Treasury Decisions, permitting spouses in all community
property states, except California, to split income that was community property. 23 The earlier Treasury Opinion, which acquiesced in the Blum case
and applied to California law, was withdrawn. 24 However, in 1924, the Attorney General limited his opinion to taxation of community property on the
death of the husband, leaving unresolved the issue of whether California
25
allowed income-splitting of community property.
Subsequently, a California taxpayer attempted to resolve the issue in
Robbins v. United States.26 In Robbins, the taxpayer was forced to include and
pay taxes on all income from community property. The taxpayer claimed
that the tax was excessive because he should have been permitted to include
only half of the income. The Attorney General and the Treasury Department, both in the district court and the California Supreme Court, asserted
that the husband is the absolute owner of the property under California state
law. The district court ruled against the Government, and held that the
husband and wife could report half of the income from the community property and half of the husband's earnings, since the California statutes defining
the husband's power of control over the community property were substantially the same as those in other community property states. The United
States Supreme Court reversed this decision on the grounds that California
law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of California, gave the wife a mere
"expectancy" in the community property during the husband's life and that
the husband's power of management and control was so extensive as to
20. Ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227.
21. See Community Aroperty, supra note 1, at 260.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Ch.234, 43 Stat. 253.
Treas. Reg. 65 § 213, art. 31 (1924).
I.R.B. 111-23-1591, III-I C.B. 101 (1924).
34 Op. Att'y Gen. 395, 405 (1924).
5 F.2d 690 (N.D. Cal. 1925), rev'd, 269 U.S. 315 (1926).
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27
render him liable for the tax.

Until this case, the Treasury had proceeded upon the belief that division of community property income depended upon whether the wife had a
vested interest in the property, and not on whether she actually had any
control over it. After the Robbins decision, the Treasury decided that because
the husband usually had significant powers of control and management over
community property the government could tax the husband for the total
community property income in all community property states. Consequently, the earlier Palmer opinion, which allowed income splitting in community property states was withdrawn, 28 giving the Secretary of the
Treasury an opportunity to litigate the tax issue in states other than
California.
Subsequent to the Robbins decision, the California Civil Code was
amended to conform to statutes in other community property states. The
new code divided community property between the spouses by providing
that the wife's interest was "present, existing and equal" with the husband's
interest. 29 Thus, the amended laws of California, as well as the community
property laws of Washington, Arizona, Louisiana, and Texas were subjected
to general test cases before the United States Supreme Court.
The first test case, Poe v. Seaborn,3° involved a taxpayer from Washington who had income from community property in addition to his salary.
The Government argued that the broad powers of the husband over the
property made him liable for the tax on the total community income. The
Government also argued that taxing the husband and thereby preventing
preferred treatment to married couples in community property states would
result in uniform income taxation throughout the United States. The court
rejected this argument, and stated that the wife is co-owner of the property
and entitled to half the husband's income and wages. According to the Seaborn Court, the wife has a vested right in the property since the husband's
power of disposition is substantially restricted. Specifically, the wife has the
power to borrow for community purposes and to encumber the community
property. She also has the power to enjoin the collection of the husband's
separate debts out of the community property. Furthermore, the community property is not liable for judgments resulting from the husband's torts
committed while not carrying on the business of the community. The
31
Supreme Court reached similar conclusions in United States v. Macolm ,
34
33
Godell v. Koch ,32 Bender v. Pfaf, and Hopkins v. Bacon .
27. Robbins v. United States, 269 U.S. 315, 327 (1926). Justice Holmes' opinion indicated
Congress has the power to tax community property to the husband. However, Congress, in
Section 1212 of the Revenue Act of 1926, stipulated that if the wife has a "vested interest"
rather than a mere "expectancy" in the income under state law, she is entitled to include that
income on her federal return. Ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 130 (1926).
28. 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 265 (1927). The Attorney General's Opinion relating to the estate

tax also was withdrawn. 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 89 (1926).
29. CAL. CIV. CODE § 161(a), added by 1927 Cal. Stat. ch. 265.
30. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
31.
32.
33.
34.

282
282
282
282

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

792
118
127
122

(1930)
(1930)
(1930)
(1930)

(involving
(involving
(involving
(involving

the
the
the
the

laws
laws
laws
laws

of California).
of Arizona).
of Louisiana).
of Texas).
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The Seaborn Court distinguished Lucas v. Earl,35 a case also decided in
1930, in which a husband and wife in California agreed to split the husband's earned income equally between themselves. The distinction made by
the Seabom Court was based on a technical theory of title, that is, the husband's earnings were never exclusively the property of the husband because
under Washington law the wife's interest attaches automatically. In Lucas,
the income belonged to the husband, and the wife's interest was created by a
voluntary assignment of future income. The Supreme Court held earned
income could not be shifted among family members by private agreement
since the "fruits" could not be "attributed to a different tree from that on
'36
which they grew."
The Lucas decision significantly affected how taxpayers in non-community property states assigned their income, and when contrasted with Seaborn
and the other cases allowing income splitting in community property states,
it sanctioned discrimination between the tax treatment of married couples in
community property states and those in common law states. The Lucas and
following decisions made it impossible for common law taxpayers to shift
earned income to their spouses. The Lucas line of cases did not, however,
affect the transfer of unearned income such as dividends, interest, rent, and
royalties to a spouse. Investment income could be shifted to a taxpayer with
a lower tax liability if the ownership of the underlying property-bank account, stock, patent, etc.-were also transferred.
Following these cases, Congress and the Department of Treasury again
attempted to eliminate the. differential tax treatment of couples in community property states and those in common law states. One proposal, similar
to the one made in the Revenue Act of 1920, required the spouse exercising
37
management and control of community income to pay the income tax.
3
8
Another proposal required all married couples to file joint returns.
A third
proposal provided for mandatory joint returns with a special allowance for
the earned income of the husband and wife. 39 All of these proposals were
rejected. Thus, from 1913 through 1947, community property couples
benefitted from splitting of income on their returns.
Initially, there was little resentment perceived toward the community
property couples among taxpayers in common law states. This was due
mainly to the low taxes levied during those years. The tax rate in 1913 to
1915 was 1% on the first $20,000 of taxable income. 4° From 1919 until 1939,
the rates increased somewhat but ranged from 1.5% to 4% on the first $4,000
of income and from 3.2% to 9.17% on income over $4,000 but less than
$20,000. 4 1 During the period of 1939 to 1949, however, rates increased sub35.
36.
37.
38.

281 U.S. 111 (1930).
Id. at 115.
S. REP. No. 673, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-12, 36 (1941).
H.R. REP. No. 1040, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-22 (1941).

39. Id.
40. J. PECHMAN, .upra note 16, at 298.
41.

U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF U.S.: COLONIAL TIMES TO

1970 1094-95, 1111-12 (1975).
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stantially, particularly during World War II. For instance, the tax in 1939
on $20,000 was 9.17%;42 in 1949 it was 30.4%.4 3 As taxes began to be felt
more, common law states began to adopt community property laws to take
45
By 1948, Michigan, 44 Nebraska,
advantage of income splitting.
Oklahoma,4 6 Oregon, 47 and Pennsylvania 48 had joined the original eight

states of Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas,
and Washington in adopting community property laws. Hawaii, 49 Massachusetts, 50 and New York5 1 were considering similar steps.
The Revenue Act of 194852 was enacted to prevent more states from
adopting community property laws, as well as to diminish the use in common law states of such income splitting devices as trusts, joint tenancies,
employment agreements, and family partnerships. The 1948 Act, which
adopted a nationwide community property system for federal income tax
purposes, was designed to eliminate discrimination against couples in common law states. For the first time in United States tax history, a separate tax
rate schedule was instituted for married taxpayers. Married couples were
required to aggregate their income and deductions, and in effect, were taxed
53
as two single persons, each reporting half of the couple's aggregate income.
As a result, if only the husband were earning income, the couple paid significantly less tax than a single individual with the same amount of taxable
income.
The Act caused a tremendous loss of revenue to the federal government.
One study indicates that the government has lost in excess of $5.6 billion
annually as a result of this change. 54 It did, however, accomplish its purpose, in that common law states stopped adopting community property laws
and several states-Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Oregon-actually
repealed their laws. 55 Hawaii, then a territory, also repealed its laws. 56 The
Act also put an end to many of the income-shifting devices being used in
common law states. The Act provided a form of geographic equity, since
married couples in common law property states were now taxed the same as
married couples in community property states. Most important, however,
the Act had the effect of changing the basic tax unit for federal taxation
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 1947 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 317.
45. 1947 Neb. Laws ch. 156.

46. 1945 Okla. Sess. Laws H.B. 218.
47. 1947 Or. Laws ch. 525.
48. 1947 Pa. Laws, No. 550. In Wilcox v. Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Inc., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d
521 (1947), the Pennsylvania law was declared unconstitutional.
49. 1945 Hawaii Sess. Laws, 273 § 1. At this time Hawaii was a territory, not a state.
50. See, Bittker, supra note 1, at 1412.
51. Id.
52. Ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 114.
53. For example, a couple having taxable income of $10,000 would pay the same tax as
two single taxpayers each having taxable income of $5,000.
54. A. GROVES, FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF THE FAMILY 74 (1963); see also B. OKNER,
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 69, 70 (1966).
55. 1948 Mich. Pub. Acts 1st Ex. Sess. No. 39; 1949 Neb. Laws, Ch. 129; 1949 Okla. Sess.
Laws, H.B. 13; 1949 Or. Laws, 349.
56. 1949 Hawaii Seas. Laws, 242.
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from the individual to the married couple. Amazingly, there was no discussion of the higher tax burden placed on single persons or the reasons for
reduced rates for married couples. The reduced rate was later justified with
reasons such as family responsibilities or the additional expenses of maintain57
ing a household.
The Revenue Act of 195158 established a third set of rate schedules for
"heads of households," who were defined under the Act as single taxpayers
who maintained a household in which a dependent relative lived. Under the
new rate schedules, heads of households were given approximately half the
benefits of income splitting accorded to married couples. The head of household provisions were extended by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to include taxpayers who met certain support requirements with respect to their
parents, even though the father or mother did not live in the taxpayer's
home. 5 9 The 1954 Code also adopted the surviving spouse provision, which
extended the full income-splitting benefits enjoyed by married couples to
surviving spouses with dependent children. 6° The benefits are permitted for
two years after the death of the spouse. The rationale given in the legislative
history foi the special rates for heads of households and surviving spouses
was that of family responsibilities; certain support requirements have to be
met to qualify for head of household rates and a surviving spouse has to
6
maintain a household where a dependent child resides. '
Single taxpayers received a tax break under the Tax Reform Act of
1969.62 Before the 1969 Act, a single person's tax liability at certain income

levels was forty-two percent higher than the income tax of a married couple
with the same income. 63 The 1969 Act lowered the rates applied to single
persons so that the single taxpayer was subjected to no more than a twenty
percent differential between his or her tax liability and that of a married
couple with the same taxable income. The existing single person's tax rate
schedule became the new "married filing separately" rate schedule, a fourth
rate schedule. This schedule allowed married couples, both of whom earned
substantial income, to avoid the progressive impact of consolidating their
incomes. Nevertheless, when the income of the two spouses approached
equal amounts, the rate of tax on their income, whether they filed jointly or
separately, was heavier than if the couple had chosen not to marry. Thus,
two income-producing persons sharing the same household increased their
tax burden by marrying.
The burden on single persons and married couples resulted in a number
ofjudicial challenges to the tax code. In 1965 a single taxpayer brought suit
57. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1416-17.
58. Ch. 521 § 301, 65 Stat. 480.

59. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(B).
60.
61.
62.
63.

I.R.C. § 2.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1954).
Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 803, 83 Stat. 487.

JOINT COMMrEE ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SESs., REPORT ON THE INCOME
TAX TREATMENT OF MARRIED COUPLES AND SINGLE PERSONS 23 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
JOINT COMMITTEE].
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in Ke//ems v. Commissioner,6 4 challenging the tax law under the fifth, ninth,
fourteenth, and sixteenth amendments as well as under article I section 2
clause 3 and article I section 9 clause 4 of the United States Constitution.
The taxpayer's claim with respect to the ninth and sixteenth amendments
and first article of the Constitution was that 1) the amount of tax paid by
her was in excess of that which would be payable if joint return rates were
applied to her income, 2) the tax paid was not an income tax, and 3) the
tax paid was not a tax which was apportioned among the states. The fifth
and fourteenth amendment "equal protection" claims were based on the fact
that Congress had no rational basis for the distinction drawn between married and single persons for purposes of the applicable rates of tax. All of the
taxpayer's claims were denied by the Tax Court, which devoted most of its
opinion to the taxpayer's fourteenth amendment argument. The court held
that the joint tax schedule was necessary to insure geographic uniformity
and to forestall the trend by state governments to adopt community property laws. 65 In addition, the court noted that conceivably Congress could
have believed that married persons generally have greater financial burdens
66
than single persons.
Several married couples brought suit in Johnson v. United States,6 7 challenging the tax law under the first, fourth, fifth, ninth and tenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The taxpayers' main argument
was that the due process clause of the fifth amendment had been violated in
the following four respects:
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

the due process clause of the fifth amendment forbids tax rate
differentiation by which the tax on the income of one spouse
is measured in part by the income of the other spouse;
the due process clause of the fifth amendment forbids
gendered-based tax rate differentiation that results in a
greater burden on married female workers than is imposed
upon married male workers;
the due process clause of the fifth amendment forbids marital
classification by which higher tax rates are imposed on the
taxable income of a married person (whose spouse has significant income) than are imposed on the same taxable income of
an unmarried person; and
the due process clause of the fifth amendment forbids classification by which higher tax rates are imposed on the taxable
income of a married person who lives with her spouse than are
imposed on the taxable income of one who does not. 68

The taxpayers asserted that the classifications under the tax code penalized them for asserting their fundamental right to marry and interfered with
their fundamental right of privacy and association, as protected by the first,
64. 58 T.C. 556 (1972), ajf'dper cunam, 474 F.2d 1399 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831
(1973).

65. 58 T.C. at 559.
66. Id.

67. 422 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ind. 1976), afdsub noma,Baxter v. United States, 550 F.2d 1239
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978).
68. 422 F. Supp. at 962-63.
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fourth, fifth, ninth and tenth amendments. In addition, the taxpayers
claimed the "free exercise" clause of the first amendment was violated because that clause prohibits the imposition of higher tax rates on those who
practice their religious beliefs in regard to marriage.
The Johnson court held there was no due process violation under the
taxpayers' first claim since federal law contained no compulsory income aggregation provision. 69 Each taxpayer may make the individual choice to file
a separate return and avoid "attribution of income." As to the second due
process argument, the court held the federal tax schedules at issue, married
filing separately, cannot be said to burden all women, if indeed any are so
burdened. 70 According to the court, these schedules avoid any type of assumption about the economic status of men and women and therefore there
is no basis for holding that women and men are treated differently. 7 1 As to
the third and fourth claims, the court recognized the fundamental nature of
marriage and freedom to marry under the Constitution, but held that the
marriage penalty strictly construed does not create such a severe marriage
discrimination that it amounts to a prohibition. 72 The court emphasized
that the tax rate schedules are not always a disadvantage to those who are
married. Congress' longstanding policy that married couples with equal aggregate incomes should pay equal taxes regardless of differences in the contributions of each spouse to the total also influenced the court. Equal tax
treatment of the marriage unit, the taxable entity since 1948, was recognized
as a legitimate legislative objective. The Johnson court concluded that the
government has a compelling interest which justifies the burden upon marriage. 73 As to the taxpayers' last argument-infringement upon the right to
freely exercise their religious beliefs as to marriage-the court held there is
no impermissible restriction on that right. 74 According to the court, the fact
that some married persons may pay more taxes due to their peculiar economic circumstances does not render a general taxing statute a regulation of
religious beliefs. In conclusion, the court asserted that even if it agreed that
the Code provisions under attack burden the taxpayer's free exercise of his
religion, the government has a sufficiently substantial interest in raising revenue and in equalizing the tax burden between single and married taxpayers
to justify any incidental burden on the taxpayer. 75
The Johnson case was followed in Mafpes v.United States, 76 which recognized that marriage is a fundamental right; but, unlikeJohnson, Mapes held
that strict scrutiny of the marriage penalty was unnecessary. The appropriate test was one of "minimum rationality."' 77 The tax system met this test
because it merely discourages rather than proscribes marriage. 78 As in John69. Id. at 967-68.
70. Id. at 968.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

969.
970-73.
973.
975.

76. 576 F.2d 896 (Ct. C1.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).

77. 576 F.2d at 901.
78. Id.
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son, the court found no gender-based discrimination. As these cases illustrate, taxpayers' judicial attempts
to alleviate the marriage penalty and
79
singles penalty have failed.
II.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981

Under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, there are five rate
schedules: the joint schedule,80 the heads of households schedule, 81 the singles schedule, 82 the married filing separately schedule, 83 and the estates and
trusts schedule. 84 The 1981 Act did not change the following advantages
enjoyed under previous law: 1) married couples that file jointly receive a
tax advantage from income splitting when their incomes are unevenly distributed; 2) the tax liability of the head of household is more than the tax
liability of a married couple, even if their income and family expenses are
identical; 85 3) at all income levels, the single person bears a heavier tax burden than the head of household or married couple filing jointly with the
same amount of income; 8 6 and 4) the married couple electing to file separately is taxed more severely than if that couple were allowed to elect to file
under the singles' rates.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act establishes a new rate schedule for
trusts and estates that is even less favorable than the rates of married persons
filing separately. The big change brought about by the Economic Recovery
Tax Act, however, is the provision that allows a married couple with two
incomes to deduct from gross income an amount equal to a percentage of the
lower-paid spouse's earned income.8 7 During 1982 the percentage is five
percent. The percentage increases in future tax years to ten percent. In no
year, however, may the percentage be applied to more than $30,000 of the
79. Married couples have also attempted to avoid the marriage tax penalty by divorcing at
the end of the tax year, filing as single persons and remarrying at the beginning of the next year.
In order to deny tax effect to these "sham divorces," the IRS issued Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2,
C.B. 40. The validity of this ruling was addressed in Boter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980),
in which the Tax Court refused to recognize a Haitian divorce obtained by a married couple
living in Maryland at the end of the tax year. The Tax Court supported its holding with a 1945
Supreme Court case, Wilamr v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), which declared that the
domicile of at least one spouse is a prerequisite to recognition by all other states of a divorce
decree under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.
The Boyter decision left unresolved the issue of whether a divorce decree that is valid under
state law should be disregarded for federal income tax purposes pursuant to Rev. Rul. 76-255.
Because there are substantial non-tax consequences associated with a valid divorce, it is arguable that the Revenue Ruling may not be given effect. For example, if one spouse should die
during the time interval of nonmarriage, life insurance and other insurance coverage may lapse,
joint ownership of property may terminate, and a spouse's intestate interest could end. Because
of these adverse state law consequences, courts may decide not to give Rev. Rul. 76-255 effect.
80. I.R.C. § 1(a) (as amended by Section 101 of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981),
Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 173 [hereinafter cited as the Economic Recovery Tax Act].
81. I.R.C. § 1(b).
82. Id. at § 1(c).
83. Id. at § 1(d).
84. Id. at § I(e).
85. The head of household still pays taxes at rates between those of single persons and
those filing jointly.
86. In no case, however, will a single person pay more than 20% of the amount paid by a
married couple with the same income.
87. I.R.C. § 221 (as amended by Section 103 of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
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lower-paid spouse's income. Thus, the maximum deduction would be
$1,500 for tax years beginning in 1982 and $3,000 for 1983 and thereafter.
This new provision will cost the federal government an estimated $419 million in 1982, $4.4 billion in 1983, $9.1 billion in 1984, $11 billion in 1985,
and $12.6 billion in 1986.88
Congress considered a number of alternative proposals for eliminating
the marriage penalty,8 9 but chose to follow the recommendations made in
an earlier Senate Finance Committee bill and adopted the deduction proposal.9° That Committee decided the deduction was the simplest way to alleviate the marriage penalty. 9 1 The Committee Report referred to recent
studies showing that high marginal tax rates on the income of a second
earner adversely affected that earner's decision to seek employment. 92 In
addition, the Committee noted that two-earner couples may be less able to
pay their income tax than one-earner couples with the same amount of income. The Committee cited the employment-related expenses, such as
clothing and transportation, of two-earner couples9 3 and the fact that such
94
couples have less free time for family chores and child care.
The two-earner deduction is calculated like employment-related deductions in arriving at adjusted gross income. 95 First, the taxpayer determines
the "qualified earned income" amount, 96 which consists of "earned income" 97 less specified allowable deductions. 98 Then, the appropriate percentage (five percent in 1982 and ten percent thereafter) of that amount is
deducted from gross income to arrive at adjusted gross income. 99
The definition of earned income under the Economic Recovery Tax
Act'0° coincides with the definition found in section 401(c)(2) of the Code
(dealing with the earned income credit) and section 911 (d) (2) of the Code
(dealing with income from sources outside the United States). Thus, earned
income includes wages, salaries, tips, and anything else of value (money,
goods, or services) received for personal services-regardless of whether the
amount is taxable.' 0 ' In addition, it includes net earnings from self-employment. 10 2 Under the new Act, as under the earned income credit, earned
income must be computed without regard to any community property
laws.' 0 3 Therefore, earned income must be attributed to the spouse who ren88. CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 290, 97th Cong., 1st Sess, (1981) [hereinafter
cited as CONFERENCE REPORT).
89. See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 63.
90. S. REP. No. 96-940, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (report on H.R. 5829).
91. Id. at 34.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. I.R.C. § 62(16) (added by § 103(b) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
96. I.R.C. § 221(b)(1) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
97. I.R.C. § 221(b) (1) (A) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
98. I.R.C. § 221(b)(1)(B) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
99. I.R.C. § 221(a)(1), (2) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
100. I.R.C. § 221(b)(2) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
101.

U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY

1040 FEDERAL INCOME TAX FORM AND INSTRUC-

TIONS 15 (1981).

102. Id.
103. I.R.C. § 221(b)(1) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
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dered the services for which the income is received. In the case of a person
employed by a corporation, earned income does not include any distributions from earnings and profits unless the distributions constitute reasonable
compensation for services actually rendered.' 0 4 In the case of a person engaged in a trade or business (other than in corporate form) in which both
personal services and capital are material income-producing factors, earned
income is a reasonable amount for services actually rendered. 0 5 In such a
case, however, a person may not have earned income in excess of thirty percent of his share of net profits from the trade or business. '0 6 Earned income
does not include interest, dividends, estate and trust distributions, or capital
gains and losses, and most rents will not qualify as earned income, except
where the owner of the property renders services to occupants or aids materi10 7
ally in the production of farm products grown on rented land.
The Act specifically provides that earned income will not cover
amounts not includable in gross income,' 0 8 since those amounts will not result in a work disincentive. Thus, social security benefits, veterans benefits,
tax exempt interest, and other exempt income do not enter into the calculation. Similarly, pensions, 10 9 annuities," 0 individual retirement plan distribution,"' and deferred compensation" 2 are excluded.
Pensions and
annuities are excluded from earned income because these amounts are composed largely of investment income that has been accumulated tax-free.
This exclusion is necessary because the proposal is intended to benefit individuals currently earning income, and not to create a windfall for those
whose work took place in past years. 1 3 Distributions from individual retirement plans are excluded so that parity with qualified plans can be maintained."14 Other forms of deferred compensation are excluded from the
definition of earned income for similar reasons."'5 Additionally excluded are
wages currently exempt from certain social security taxes because an individual is employed by his or her spouse. The wages are excluded because
1) they are exempt from social security tax-thus substantial relief is already provided-and 2) the spouses could shift earned income between
themselves and attribute an inaccurate or unreasonable amount of earned
income to the second earner." 16 In general, the exclusions are consistent
with the definitions that apply to the earned income credit.
Following the determination of earned income, the allowable deduc104. Treas. Reg. § 1.911-2(b)(1) (1981).
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.911-2(b)(2) (1981).
106. Id.
107.

[1982] 1 STAND. FED. TAx REP. (CCH)

519J.05.

108. I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)(A)(i) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
109. I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)(A)(ii) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
110. Id.
111. I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)(A)(iii) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
112. I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)(A)(iv) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act). In
general, deferred compensation is any amount received after the close of the taxable year following the taxable year in which the services are performed.
113. S. REP. No. 96-940, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1980).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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tions must be ascertained. In general, the Act allows the deductions in Code
section 62(1), (2), (7), (9), (10), and (15).117 The deductions must be allocable to or chargeable against the earned income of the lower-paid spouse, and
include expenses attributable to a trade or business from which the earned
income is derived. (This corresponds to the deduction under section 62(1)).
If, for example, the gross income from a trade or business includes other than
earned income, only the proportional share of the deductions attributable to
the earned income from the trade or business -can be deducted. Typical
trade or business expenses include losses, bad debts, depreciation, and rent.
Expenses paid or incurred while performing services as an employee (section
62(2)) are also allowed as deductions under the Act, including travel and
transportation expenses, expenses incurred by an outside salesperson, and
reimbursed expenses.' 18 All other deductible employee business expenses
are itemized deductions, and would not reduce the employee's earned income. Consequently, employees may have a possible tax advantage over
professionals and others not considered employees if the employee itemizes
his or her deductions.' 1 9 Deductions for contributions by a self-employed
person to a qualified retirement plan, deductions relating to pension plans of
Subchapter S corporations, and deductions for contributions to an individual retirement plan are also permitted (section 62(7), (9), and (10) respectively). Certain deductions are not allowed under the new Act since they do
not relate to earned income. These deductions include those relating to long
term capital gains (section 62(3)); to losses from the sale or exchange of property (section 62(4)); and to deductions attributable to rents and royalties
(section 62(5)). In addition, the moving expense deduction (section 62(8)),
while relating directly to earned income, is not allowed. Moving expenses,
which are infrequent and usually large, could not be included in the qualified earned income without drastically reducing qualified earned income
amount, and, in some instances, eliminating it altogether. It is also possible
that certain section 62 deductions specifically allowed under the earned income provision could be large and infrequent, causing distortion of the
amount. An example of this is an educational expense to maintain and improve the taxpayer's job, this is a section 62(1) deduction for professionals
and the self-employed. Such a deduction, along with the deduction for
120
could substantially reduce
meals and lodging "while away from home,"'
the earned income amount. In such a case the marital deduction provision
would not be fully effective in reducing the marriage penalty.
The Act specifies that no deduction is allowed if either spouse claims on
the joint return the benefits of Code section 911 (relating to income earned
by individuals outside the United States), or Code section 931 (relating to
income from sources within possessions of the United States). Couples bene117. I.R.C. § 221(b)(1)(B) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
118. I.R.C. § 62(2).

119. In certain cases, as, for example, where there are educational expenses, this treatment
could significantly benefit the employee.
120. This combination of educational expense deductions and deductions for meals and
lodging could occur when an employee takes a leave of absence from his or her job to maintain
and improve job skills.
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fiting from these provisions are excluded from the new deductions because
substantial relief is provided elsewhere in the Economic Recovery Tax Act
for income earned abroad and because coordinating the new deduction with
these provisions would be too complicated. 2 ' This provision is consistent
with the eligibility rules for the earned income credit, which does not apply
to situations in which Code sections 911 and 931 are involved.
Although the new provision may be conceptually simple, calculating
the deduction is a complicated matter, as the above discussion illustrates,
and will undoubtedly present the IRS with administrative problems. One of
the most difficult problems will arise when a taxpayer has disability income
or unemployment compensation. The relationship between the earned income deduction and Code section 105 (dealing with amounts received under
accident and health plans), and Code section 85, (dealing with unemployment compensation), is extremely complex. Under section 105 of the Code,
a disability income exclusion of up to $5,200 annually is available to certain
disabled, retired taxpayers under the age of sixty-five. The exclusion phases
out on a dollar-for-dollar basis as adjusted gross income exceeds $15,000.
This adjusted gross income limit is calculated without regard to the earned
income deduction (which is usually a deduction to arrive at adjusted gross
income).1 22 The deduction is then computed, excluding from earned income the amount of the disability income. Similarly, under section 85, unemployment compensation is included in income once the adjusted gross
income figure of $20,000 is reached. Thus, a taxpayer includes unemployment compensation in income without regard to the earned income deduction. 123 It is possible that the calculations may pose an administrative
problem. The problem may not be too significant, however, because only a
small percentage of taxpayers have either unemployment compensation or
disability income.
A greater administrative problem may arise when taxpayers enter into
employment, partnership, and corporate agreements to shift income to the
lower-paid spouse. These agreements will give rise to all of the problems
with assignment of income that the IRS had before the 1948 Act.' 24 The
abuse from such agreements may be minimized, however, because earned
income does not include wages exempt from social security paid to one
spouse who is employed by the other spouse. If this social security exemption does not apply, as, for example, when there is a corporate entity, there is
a tax advantage to income-splitting. The following table illustrates how the
taxes of a husband and wife with a combined income of $60,000 vary as the
121. An individual present in a foreign country for 330 full days in any period of 12 consecutive months may elect to exclude foreign earned income attributable to the period of foreign
residence or presence at an annual rate of $75,000 for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1982. This amount is increased $5,000 a year over the next four years to $95,000. Thus,
at the end of the phase-in period a taxpayer will be able to exclude up to $95,000. In the case of
a married couple, the exemption is computed separately for each qualifying individual. Ste,
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 88, at 203.
122. Section 103(c) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act.
123. Id.
124. See Community Property, supra note 1.
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income of each spouse varies. (The table assumes that the deduction is fully
effective).
A

B

C

Income
higherpaid
spouse

Income
lowerpaid
spouse

10% El
deduction

$60,000
55,000
50,000

$

0
5,000
10,000

$

D

E

F

G

Exemptions

Taxable
Income
(A+B)-(C+D)

(1984)
Tax
Liability

Tax
Differential

0
500
1,000

$3,000*
2,000
2,000

$57,000
57,500
57,000

$14,028
14,218
14,028

$ 190
190

45,000

15,000

1,500

2,000

56,500

13,838

190

40,000
35,000
30,000

20,000
25,000
30,000

2,000
2,500
3,000

2,000
2,000
2,000

56,000
55,500
55,000

13,648
13,458
13,268

190
190
190
1,140

*

An extra exemption is allowed here because one spouse is a dependent.

As evidenced in the table, a couple earning $60,000 can save $1,140 in taxes
by entering into a valid income-splitting arrangement.
Couples in community property states are likely to argue that their
earned income is automatically split with the other spouse, and will cite Poe
v. Seaborn to defend their position. Undoubtedly, the taxpayers will lose in
any court challenge because it is clear that Congress has the power to disre25
gard state law for federal tax purposes. 1
Although administrative problems may arise under the new deduction
provision, the more significant problem is one of equity. As the above table
illustrates, the new tax structure is not horizontally equitable, whereby taxpayers who are equally situated are taxed equally. Under our tax system
this has been interpreted to mean that the tax of a married couple does not
differ when the proportion of income contributed by each spouse differs-as
long as the couple has the same combined amount of income. Because married couples pool their income and spend as a unit, they, according to this
theory, should be taxed on aggregate income. Under the new tax structure
the married couple's tax changes depending on the earned income of the
lower-paid spouse.
The purpose of this change in policy seems to be that of economic efficiency. According to this principle, the tax system should encourage the full
utilization of human resources in the work force. Thus, the tax rates should
be lowest on persons whose work effort is most responsive to lower taxes.
Because taxing the lower-paid spouse at the marginal rate of the higher-paid
spouse can adversely affect the lower-paid spouse's decision to work-at least
in the low and medium income tax brackets-reducing the rate by providing
a deduction alleviates the disincentive. The new provision, however, only
removes the disincentive where Congress felt the disincentive had the greatest impact-when the lower paid spouse's income is less than $30,000. The
earned income deduction does not actually encourage work by the nonworking spouse. As the table above illustrates, if a spouse decides to work,
125. Congress has disregarded community property law in the Code before. Se, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 402(e).
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the $ 1,000 extra dependency exemption will be lost, increasing the tax liability of the couple. In addition, social security taxes and employment-related
expenses (transportation, clothing, household chores, and possible child
care) 126 are incurred-all of which would most likely exceed the earned income deduction.
Congress apparently felt that the earned income deduction should vary
depending on the lower-paid spouse's salary. While it is clear that child care
and household expenses remain relatively constant for all those who work
and have children, it is possible that the food, clothing, and transportation
expenses would vary in relation to the salary level. Thus, there is some rationale for the way the deduction is established. Yet, the tax savings from
the deduction depends on the combined income of the couple, not on the
earnings of the lower-paid spouse. Thus, a spouse earning $5,000 in 1984
obtains a $60 tax benefit when the other spouse earns $5,000, but a tax benefit of $210 when the other spouse earns $65,000.127 The difference is due to
the fact that the value of a deduction increases as the income level of the
taxpayer increases. The discriminatory effect of the deduction is reduced
somewhat because the Economic Recovery Tax Act reduces the top tax rates
from seventy percent to fifty percent. However, the deduction is inequitable
to those in the lower income brackets where the tax benefit should arguably
be higher because the needs of the family are likely to be greater.
The earned income deduction was not enacted to discourage couples
from "living in sin" because if that had been its purpose, there would be no
$30,000 limit. As it stands now, the marriage penalty continues and becomes more severe at the higher maximum marginal tax rates and when the
separate incomes of the spouses are more nearly equal. The following table,
which assumes the separate incomes of the spouses are equal and that the
earned income deduction is fully effective, illustrates this.
126. Under the new law, the maximum child care credit is $2,400 for one dependent and
$4,800 for two or more dependents. The credit is 30% of employment-related expenses of taxpayers with incomes of $10,000 or less. The credit is reduced by 1% for each $2,000, or fraction
thereof, of income above $10,000. Therefore, taxpayers with adjusted gross income above
$28,000 will have a credit rate of 20%. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 88, at 201.

127. The following are examples of the differing tax benefits under the new El deduction.
HigherLowerTax
Tax
Taxable
Personal
E.I.
paid
paid
Benefit
Bracket
Income
Exemption
deduction
spouse
spouse
$60
12% x 500
7,500
2,000
500
5,000
5,000 .
$90
18% X 500
17,500
2,000
500
15,000
5,000
$125
25% X 500
27,500
2,000
500
25,000
5,000
$165
33% x 500
37,500
2,000
500
35,000
5,000
$190
38% X 500
47,500
2,000
500
45,000
5,000
$190
38% X 500
57,500
2,000
500
55,000
5,000
$210
42% X 500
67,500
2,000
500
65,000
5,000
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C
Taxable
C2ombined
Income
Gross
PE* &
as
(Earned) 10% EI Joint
Income Deduction (A-B)
S 10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
200,000
*

B
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D
E
F
G
H
I
Tax
Taxable
Tax as
Tax
Tax
Tax Married Savings
Penalty
Under
Income
From From Filing
joint Single/Married as
Filing
Return
Filing
Single Separately Divorce Separately
(1984)
Separately
(1984)
(1984) (D-(Fx2)) ((Gx2)-D)

$2,500 $ 7,500$ 471
3,000
17,000 1,921
3,500
26,500 3,940
4,000
36,000 6,538
4,500
45,500 9,673
5,000
55,000 13,268
5,000
65,000 17,268
5,000
75,000 21,468
5,000
85,000 25,668
5,000
95,000 30,150
5,000
115,000 39,374
5,000
135,000 49,174
5,000
155,000 58,974
5,000
195,000 78,900

$ 4,000
9,000
14,000
19,000
24,000
29,000
34,000
39,000
44,000
49,000
59,000
69,000
79,000
99,000

193 $ 265
915
1,050
1,801
2,157
2,945
3,599
4,265
5,304
7,204
5,773
9,264
7,473
11,364
9,369
11,369
13,770
13,469
16,000
17,891
20,422
22,691
25,322
27,491
30,222
39,700
37,433

S

$

85
91
338
648
1,143
1,722
2,322
2,730
2,930
3,212
3,592
3,792
3,992
4,030

$

59

179
374
660
935
1,140
1,260
1,260
1,872
1,890
1,470
1,470
1,470
500

PE = personal exemptions of $2,000

Column H above indicates that if the taxpayers were divorced they
could save considerable taxes. Column I indicates that married taxpayers
filing separately end up paying significantly more tax than if they had filed
jointly. Therefore, the couple pays significantly more tax than if they had
filed as two singles. There still may be circumstances, however, when it will
be more favorable for a married couple to file separately, as for example,
28
when one spouse has a large deductible item.'
It is also interesting to note that for the tax year 1982, the marriage
penalty is not eliminated when the lower-paid spouse earns less than $30,000
due to the fact that the deduction is only five percent. The following table
indicates the severity of this penalty.
A
Combined
Gross
(Earned)
Income*

B

C

Personal
Exemption

5%
El
Deduction
(1982)

D
Taxable
Income
Under
Joint
Return

E

F

G

H

Tax
Under
Joint
Return

Taxable
Income
If Single

Singles
Tax

Marriage
Penalty
(E-(GX2))

$ 4,000
9,000
14,000
19,000
24,000
29,000

$ 216
1,043
2,100
3,442
5,012
7,012

$ 138
257
606
1,141
1,851
2,141

$10,000
$2,000
$ 250
$ 7,750 $ 570
$20,000
2,000
500
17,500
2,343
$30,000
2,000
750
27,250
4,806
$40,000
2,000
1,000
37,000
8,025
$50,000
2,000
1,250
46,750
11,875
$60,000
2,000
1,500
56,500
16,165
Assume income is split equally between the spouses.

The marriage penalty also continues to exist when both spouses have
investment income and when investment income represents a significant portion of the couple's total income. Thus, couples that have investment income will also obtain a tax advantage from "living in sin" or obtaining a
128. The most typical example is when one spouse has a large medical deduction. Because
a percentage of adjusted gross income is a floor under the medical expense deduction, a twoearner couple may lower the floor by filing separately.
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divorce. 129
Another inequitable problem remaining after the Economic Recovery
Act is the continuing discrimination against single taxpayers. At all levels of
income the single person pays more tax than a one-earner couple with the
same amount of income. The following table indicates the singles penalty at
various income levels.

Gross
Income

Taxable
Income of
one-earner
married
couple*

Taxable
Income
of
single"

Tax on
one-earner
couple
(1984)

Tax
on
single
(1984)

Singles
penalty

$10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000

$7,000
17,000
27,000
37,000
47,000
57,000
67,000

$9,000
19,000
29,000
39,000
49,000
59,000
69,000

$411
1,921
4,065
6,868
10,228
13,952
18,108

$915
2,945
5,773
9,369
13,469
17,891
22,211

$504
1,024
1,708
2,501
3,241
3,939
4,103

*
**

Personal exemptions = $2,000/dependency exemption = $1,000.
Personal exemption = $1,000.

Similarly, two single persons pay more tax than a two-earner married couple
30
with the same amount of income.'
To summarize the tax system as it relates to marital status: 1) the tax
system is still not marriage neutral because it treats single persons differently
from married couples in similar circumstances; 2) the system is not horizontally equitable-married couples with the same combined income but with
different separate incomes have different taxes;i 3 1 3) the marriage penalty
still exists; and 4) administrative difficulties may arise in determining the
earned income deduction.
Although there are problems with the new deduction provision, a similar provision is being used in a number of foreign countries. In the United
Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Switzerland an earned income
allowance is given when both spouses receive earned income independently
129. The following table illustrates a few examples of the effect of the penalty:
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

Tax
Taxable Under Taxable Tax
as
Income
Combined Combined Combined PE & 10% Income Joint
as
Single
Gross
EI
as Joint Return
Earned
Investment
Single
(1984)
Income
Deduction (C-D) (1984)
Income
Income*

Marriage
Penalty
(F-(HX2))

$463
$3,000
$27,000 $4,065 $14,000 $1,801
$20,000
$10,000
$30,000
19,000
2,945
978
40,000
3,000
37,000
6,868
20,000
20,000
9,848
24,000 4,625
1,318
50,000
4,000
46,000
40,000
10,000
2,102
56,000 13,648
29,000 5,773
20,000 '
60,000
4,000
40,000
34,000
7,473
2,742
4,000
66,000 17,688
40,000
30,000
70,000
39,000 9,445
2,578
20,000
80,000
5,000
75,000 21,468
60,000
2,930
5,000
85,000 25,668
44,000 11,369
60,000
30,000
90,000
3,212
5,000
95,000 30,150
49,000 13,469
60,000
40,000
100,000
* Assume income is split equally between the spouses.
130. Se, Chart, top of page 782 supra.
131. It is impossible to have marriage neutrality and horizontal equity unless a proportional
tax system is adopted.
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of one another. 132 Similarly, in Sweden, there is an earned income allowhas a child
ance, but the maximum benefit applies only when the13couple
3
under the age of sixteen living in the taxpayer's home.
III.

ALTERNATIVES

A number of different approaches to the marital status discrimination
problem have been proposed and several of them are in effect in other countries. The proposals range from eliminating both types of discrimination to
only partially eliminating the marriage penalty. Proposals that partially
eliminate the penalty include: 1) the credit proposal, 2) the optional use of
the singles' schedule by married persons, 3) the optional use of the joint
schedule by single persons and heads of households, 4) the split return, and
5) flattening the tax rates. The proposals that completely eliminate marital
status discrimination include: 1) the proportional tax system, 2) the onerate schedule, and 3) the dual-rate schedule.
A.

PartialElimination of Marital Status Discrimination
1.

Credit- Proposal

One method to reduce the marriage penalty is to grant a tax credit
equal to a percentage of the earnings of the lower-paid spouse. Like the
earned income deduction, this proposal will not completely eliminate the
marriage penalty nor will it change the singles penalty. The credit proposal
is as simple as the deduction proposal, and the calculations for determining
the earned income amount would be the same. Like the deduction, it abandons the horizontal equity concept that all married couples with equal income should pay the same tax regardless of each spouse's contribution to the
couple's total income. The advantage to this proposal is that it is more progressive than a deduction. It avoids the discriminatory effect that a deduction has on lower-income couples. It would not, however, be as effective as a
deduction, per dollar of revenue loss, in reducing marginal tax rates in the
higher income brackets where high marginal rates present the most serious
problems. Under such a proposal the revenue loss would be comparable to
the losses under the deduction proposal.' 34 Such a proposal has been introduced in Congress; 135 however, it is not a common provision in the tax statutes of other western countries.
2.

Optional Use of Singles' Schedules By Married Persons

A method to eliminate the marriage penalty completely is to allow mar136
Unlike the
ried persons use of the singles' rate for their separate incomes.
132. Information on tax laws of other countries was found in current editions of ARTHUR
ANDERSEN & Co., TAx AND TRADE GUIDE; INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, SUPPLEMENTARY SERVICE TO EUROPEAN TAxATION; and WORLD TAX SERIES, supra

note 7.
133.

TAX AND TRADE GUIDE, supra note 132, at 79 (Sweden 1978).

134. Set JOINT COMMrIrEE, supra note 63, at 59.
135. H.R. 6798, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
136. See Gerzog, supra note 1, at 44; S. 336, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980); H.R. 3609, 96th
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deduction or credit provision, this proposal would eliminate entirely the
marriage disincentive associated with the marriage penalty and totally
equalize the secondary earner's work incentive to that of his or her spouse.
The proposal, however, would not solve the discrimination problem against
single persons. In addition, like the deduction or credit provision, it abandons the horizontal equity concept. Perhaps the most troublesome problem
with this proposal is that of administrative feasibility. As with the credit and
deduction provisions, community property laws would be disregarded to
avoid the problem that existed prior to 1948 (the discrimination against
couples in common law states). Unlike the credit and deduction provisions,
however, investment income would have to be divided, either by an exact
method or an allocation method. In addition, all deductions and credits
would have to be allocated between the spouses. An arbitrary formula
would create new marriage inequities and unfairness vzs-a-vIs single persons
because they would be taxed under an exact method. The exact method, on
the other hand, could cause an administrative burden on a couple that normally shares expenses and does not keep exact records as to who earns the
income or incurs the expense. Also, .there is the problem that community
property states automatically divide investment income between the spouses.
Advocates of this change claim that allocation problems can be solved by
adopting the allocation rules presently existing when married persons file
separately.' 37
3.

Optional Use of Joint Schedules By Single Persons and Heads of
Households

This proposal would combine the present tax rate schedules into two
schedules-the single schedule and the joint schedule. The rate under the
two schedules would be the same as under present law. All taxpayers, except
dual-income married taxpayers, would use the joint schedule. Dual-income
married taxpayers, on the other hand, could opt to use the single tax rate
schedule when advantageous to do so (that is, when their incomes are substantially equal). Otherwise, the couple would file under the joint schedule.
Frequently, this proposal is accompanied by suggestions for larger dependency exemptions and a deduction or credit for second-earners. Without
such a credit or deduction, this proposal would eliminate the discrimination
against single persons but not against married persons. In fact, it would exacerbate the marriage penalty because two-earner couples would either have
to file jointly and be taxed at unfavorably progressive rates or file as single
persons at more discriminatory rates. In addition, this proposal would also
pose administrative problems. As in the prior proposal, married persons
filing as single persons would need to allocate income, deductions, and credits between themselves. Finally, this proposal would result in large revenue
Cong., 1st Sess. (1980); H.R. 5012, 96th Cong., IstSess. (1980). The United Kingdom is one of
the few countries that allows a married couple to opt to file as single persons when it would be
advantageous for them to do so. See TAX AND TRADE GUIDE, supra note 132.

137. Few controversies have developed over the proper allocation of income, deductions,
exemptions, and credits between husband and wife under present law because. so few couples

file separately. See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 63, at 38-45.
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losses since single person and heads of households would pay less tax when
one-earner families would be
filing under the joint rate schedules. Small
138
most adversely affected by this proposal.
4.

Split Tax Return

The split tax return proposal1 3 9 would completely eliminate the singles
penalty but only partially eliminate the marriage penalty. A marriage penalty would still exist when the second income source for the married couple is
primarily investment income. Under this proposal single persons, heads of
households, and married couples file under a single tax rate schedule. All
married couples file jointly but if both spouses earn income, they file a "split
return." tFirst, each spouse calculates his or her tax liability on separately
earned, income. As under the current earned income deduction, business expenses allocable to earnings are deducted. Other deductions, such as interest, medical expenses, moving expenses, and charitable gifts, do not enter the
calculation. Second, the tax liability of each spouse is added together.
Third, this amount is added to the "net investment tax," which is the tax on
the aggregate investment and earned income of the couple less the tax on the
aggregate earned income. The final result is that the singles penalty is entirely eliminated and the marriage penalty is eliminated to the extent the
couple has only earned income. The marriage 15enalty still exists, however,
when the couple has investment income. The impact of this proposal on
investment income is quite severe because such income is combined with
earned income and taxed at higher income rates. At a time when the Economic Recovery Tax Act is being used to emphasize savings and investment, 14° it is not likely that this proposal will be attractive to politicians.
As with the other proposals, this proposal abandons the horizontal equity concept and disregards community property laws. It also poses administrative problems, and is more complex than the current earned income
deduction. The proposal is less complicated, however, than when married
couples file as single persons because all the personal deductions need not be
allocated. 141
5.

Flattening the Tax Rates

The marriage penalty could be substantially reduced by widening the
tax brackets and making our tax structure more proportional. However, the
138. H.R. 872, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). This elective filing status proposal has been
introduced in Congress, however, no western country studied has adopted it.
139. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM, 86th Cong., Ist
Sess. 488-489 (1959).
140. Se CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 88, at 239-247.

141. Israel, Japan, and Venezuela have tax systems that use a form of the split return. See
Oldman & Temple, supra note 1, at 585. In these countries, the earned incomes of the spouses
are taxed separately under a single rate schedule applicable to all individual taxpayers. At all
income levels, therefore, married couples in these countries bear the same tax burdens on their
earned incomes as do single persons except for some variations caused by different personal and
dependency exemptions. Unearned income is aggregated, however, and married couples with
two such incomes are taxed more heavily than are two single persons with corresponding
incomes.
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singles penalty could still exist, depending on what schedules and rates are
established under the proposal. One such proposal made prior to the Economic Recovery Tax Act called for the following two rate schedules:
1) married filing jointly-24% of the first $35,200 of taxable income, 45% of
taxable income between $35,200 and $45,800, with existing tax rates thereafter; and 2) single taxpayers-24% of the first $23,500 of taxable income, 44%
of the taxable income between $23,500 and $34,100, with existing tax rates
thereafter.1 42 Nonrefundable credits of $800 were proposed for each single
person and head of household and $1,600 for each married couple. Under
this proposal, the marriage penalty would be virtually eliminated for couples
with less than $35,200 of taxable income, 143 and the penalty would be substantially reduced for those with higher incomes. However, the discrimination against single persons would continue. In fact, some single taxpayers
would pay greater amounts of tax under this proposal than under the law
prior to the change.
The biggest problem with this proposal is one of vertical equity, which

is the principle that taxes should be higher on those better able to afford to
pay the tax. Flattening the tax rates would distort this principle because
higher-income taxpayers frequently have more deductions and tax preference items than lower-income taxpayers. Therefore, higher-income taxpayers could end up paying less than their fair share of the taxes under this
proposal.
B.

Complete Elimination of Marital Status Discrimination
1. Proportional Tax System

The adoption of a proportional tax structure would eliminate the discrimination based on marital status. It also would be horizontally equitable
because all married couples would be taxed at a flat percentage of gross
income, adjusted gross income, or taxable income. Such a proposal would
not, however, be vertically equitable. The proportionate tax system would
necessitate a fundamental change in our traditional tax structure, which is
based on the ability to pay. Although it is possible to make this system more
progressive by adopting elaborate credit mechanisms based on income, this

would complicate the tax system. In addition, it creates the problem of
whether the income of a married couple should be combined or separated to
determine the credits. t44 If the credits are based on the combined income of
the couple, the marriage penalty might be exacerbated. If the credit is based
on each couple's taxable income, allocations of income, deductions, and
credits are necessary.1

2.

45

One-Rate" Schedule

Perhaps the most frequently suggested proposal to completely eliminate
142. See JoINT COMMITTEE, supra note 63, at 61.
143. Id.
144. See Sjostrand, supra note 1, at 424-28.
145. Id.
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the marital status discrimination is the adoption of a single-rate schedule.
Under this proposal, the individual would be the taxable unit, and each
taxpayer would file a return based on one rate schedule that includes that
taxpayer's income, deductions, and credits. This proposal would, in effect,
reinstate the pre-1948 tax structure without the joint return provisions. As
under prior proposals, this proposal would disregard community property
laws for tax purposes and each taxpayer would report the income that belonged to him or her. The proposal would create the same administrative
problems that arise when taxpayers are allowed to file separately. Investment income, deductions, and credits would have to be allocated. Under
this proposal, however, all married taxpayers, not just those with two incomes, would be required to divide and allocate their income. In addition,
this proposal would result in a substantial revenue loss, as would several of
14 6
the prior proposals.
3.

Dual or Two-Rate Schedules

This proposal would combine the present tax rate schedules into two
new rate schedules. 147 Married taxpayers would file jointly under one tax
schedule in which the rate brackets are half as wide as those in the tax schedule for single taxpayers, heads of households, and married persons electing to
file separately.1 48 Under this proposal, both -types of discrimination are
eliminated. Horizontal equity, however, is not maintained. Married couples
who have different combinations of income will pay different taxes. In fact,
married couples with equal amounts of income receive the best tax advantage, whereas couples with the greatest difference between their incomes will
be in a worse position. Because this proposal more severely affects married
couples in which only one spouse works it is often accompanied by suggestions to increase exemptions for the spouse who does not work and for
children.
The major problem with the two-rate schedule, as with several of the
prior proposals, is that an allocation scheme must be established in order for
married couples who opt to file under the singles schedule to be able to divide their income, deductions, and credits. As with most of the proposals,
there is no economic incentive to encourage a nonworking spouse to work.
146. The one-rate schedule has been adopted in Canada, Australia, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia. See WORLD TAX SERIES, srupra note 7. In Canada, couples in which spouses earn more

than a nominal amount are required to file separate returns. See Oldman & Temple, supra note
1, at 591.
147. See Harmelink & Krause, supra note 1, at 764.
148. An example under our system would be the following:
Taxable
Taxable
Income
Income
One-earner
Singles/H of H/
Tax Rates
married
Two-earner
1984
1982
couple
married
$4,400-6,500
10,800-12,900
15,000-18,200
18,200-23,500
28,800-34,100

$2,200-3,250
5,400-6,450
7,500-9,100
9,100-11,750
14,400-17,050

16%
22%
27%
31%
40%

14%
18%
23%
26%
34%
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The two-rate schedule would not be as administratively burdensome as the
one-rate schedule because not all married couples would file separately.
However, unlike the one-rate schedule, under the two-rate schedule proposal
taxpayers have the option of calculating tax under both schedules to determine which schedule provides the better tax advantage. 149
IV.

CONCLUSION

The newly enacted earned income deduction does not totally solve the
marriage penalty and leaves the singles penalty virtually unchanged. It appears to be a mere stopgap measure aimed at providing tax relief for married
couples in which the lower-paid spouse earns less than $30,000. However,
the alternatives to the earned income deduction, as shown above, have their
own problems. One advantage of the earned income deduction is its administrative manageability. Most of the other proposals (with the exception of
the credit proposal) create new complexities in the tax calculation. The
credit proposal, like the deduction proposal, will not solve the marriage penalty completely nor will it change the singles penalty. In addition, most of
the other proposals have limited results and will solve only one of the penalties, but not both. By flattening the tax rates, the marriage penalty can be
partially solved but the singles penalty would become worse. Allowing single persons to file under the joint return will increase the marriage penalty.
Additionally, allowing married individuals to file as single persons fails to
solve the singles penalty problem. The split return is perhaps the best of the
partial elimination approaches; however, it would perpetuate the marriage
penalty for couples with investment income. In addition, it is not simple to
calculate.
Analysis of the complete elimination proposals indicates that the proportional system alternative is not acceptable because of its fundamental
change in the progressivity of the tax rates. Additionally, the single-schedule
and dual-schedule proposals pose administrative feasibility problems because income, deductions, credits, and exemptions must be allocated between the spouses.
Despite these problems, many of these proposals have been adopted and
successfully used in other countries. The split return and single-schedule alternatives appear to be viable alternatives to remedy the existing penalties
on married couples and single persons. Ultimately, however, the decision to
eliminate marital status discrimination in the tax code will rest on political
considerations.

149. This only occurs, however, when one spouse has a large deduction, such as a medical
expense.

